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ABSTrACT
How does it feel to be a worm? No doubt, it feels Kafkaesque. The metamorphosis (1915) is a sto-
ry of an ordinary man, gregor Samsa, who wakes up one morning as an ungeheures Ungeziefer or 
‘giant vermin’. Is this only a bodily change, or has his mind been transformed as well? And how 
do the people around him cope with this transformation? In this paper, I am going to examine 
these issues by using tools from Franz Brentano’s (1838 –1917) and Anton marty’s (1847 –1914) 
philosophy of mind and language. rumour has it that Kafka’s stories were not only products of 
his own troubled soul, but were also profoundly influenced by the work of these two philoso-
phers. In my paper, I will cover the following issues: the influence of Franz Brentano on Anton 
marty and a fortiori on Franz Kafka (1883 –1924), who was marty’s student in Prague (and in 
this way, saying something about the School of Brentano); Brentano’s and marty’s theory of 
correct and incorrect emotions, and its traces in Kafka’s The metamorphosis; marty’s philosophy 
of language and communication as reflected in Kafka’s writings; and Brentano’s reism in com-
parison to Kafka’s nominalism, on the basis of roberto Calasso’s interpretation of Kafka.
KEYWOrDS
intentionality; theory of emotion; correct emotion; philosophy of mind; philosophy of lan-
guage; school of Brentano; intersection between literature and philosophy; body; soul
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OUTLINE
I shall start with a short exposition: presenting the setting, the characters, 
their back stories and how they all ‘met’. Franz Brentano and Anton marty 
knew each other very well from Würzburg, where marty was Brentano’s stu-
dent; marty and Kafka met in person during the latter’s lectures in Prague; 
Kafka and Brentano on the other hand never actually met. How, then, can 
we call the writer a ‘Brentanist’? This question will be answered in the first 
part: Introduction. The school of Brentano? I shall then move into four sections 
where I will be concerned with specific philosophical issues that arise from 
reading Kafka’s The metamorphosis (Kafka, 1996)1. I will be concentrating on 
The metamorphosis in particular as I believe it supplies us with the proper im-
agery to both find Brentanian and martian traces in Kafka, and to show how 
their ideas could have influenced not only philosophers and psychologists but 
also writers, and thus find their way to the world of the twentieth century 
cultural topoi.
my paper will consist of the following sections:
1) B r ent ano  v i a  ma r t y. Wha t  Ka fk a  l e a rned  du r ing  mar -
t y ’s  l e c tu r e s. This section will cover the following issues: the three 
classes of mental phenomena according to Brentano and marty, the new 
definition of psychology as the science of mental phenomena, the in-
tentional in -existence of an object in a mental act, and the paradox of 
introspection.
2) B r ent ano  and  mar t y  on  ( i n ) co r r e c t  emot ion s. This part will 
be devoted to the ‘official Brentano’ and his theory of evident judgment 
and emotion (from The origin of the knowledge of right and wrong), the 
‘not -so -official Brentano’ (from the unpublished Logic lectures) as well 
as marty and the truth -makers, Wertverhalte and two classes of beings 
in his ontology.2 I will use these tools to depict the transformation not 
only of gregor Samsa but of the whole family, and the complex relations 
between them.
3) mar t y :  l ang uage  and  commun ic a t ion .  Here, I will concentrate 
on the pragmatic and teleological aspect of marty’s philosophy of lan-
guage and the communication breakdown of the Samsas.
4) B r ent ano ’s  r e i sm  and  Ka fk a ’s  a l l e g ed  nomina l i sm .  In the 
final section I will show how the nominalism ascribed to Kafka by rob-
erto Calasso in his K (Calasso, 2011) can be interpreted in light of Bren-
tano’s reism.
1  Die Verwandlung [The metamorphosis] was first published in 1915.
2  I borrow the terms ‘official’ and ‘not official Brentano’, as well as ‘parsimonious and ba-
roque ontology’ from Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2009).
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INTrODUCTION. THE SCHOOL OF BrENTANO?
In the vast body of literature on Franz Brentano the term ‘school of Brentano’ 
is frequently banded about. This is, however, a somewhat misleading term as 
although Brentano led an intellectually active life in Vienna, he never managed 
to found any kind of official school. In actual fact, he was asked to leave the 
university and become a Privatdozent. I would therefore say that the ‘school 
of Brentano’ falls into the scope of Irrealia, to use marty’s terminology: it is 
neither real nor nonexistent.
The story behind the ‘non -existence’ of the school in question is well known 
(Smith, 1997; Simons’ Introduction in: Brentano, 1995) but, nevertheless, I shall 
rephrase it and enrich it with some conclusions I have drawn from my own re-
search on Brentano’s Aristotelian writings and Husserl’s student memories.3
Brentano was a professor in Vienna between the years 1874 and 1880 (start-
ing with the first edition of Psychology from an empirical standpoint). Previous 
to that however, he had been living in Würzburg, working as both a profes-
sor and a Catholic priest (1864 –1873). In the early 1870s, he had engaged in 
a fierce debate with the Church concerning the infallibility of the Pope (which 
he had been explicitly against) and — as a consequence — he left both the 
priesthood and his professorship. He subsequently moved to Vienna, where he 
continued his career as a layman (although not formally resigning from priest-
hood until 1879). In 1880 he decided to marry Ida Lieben and this in turn 
forced him to leave his professorship for the second time as former priests were 
banned from marrying in Austria at that time (Kamińska, 2014). He therefore 
remained a Privatdozent in Vienna until 1895, a position which made him feel 
both unhappy and marginalized as he was not allowed to supervise any doc-
toral or habilitation theses. Nevertheless, he did not resign from teaching as 
he would regularly invite his students to semi -official gatherings at his home 
organized with the assistance of his wife, Husserl being one of his frequent and 
most welcome visitors. meanwhile in Vienna, the university chair was taken up 
by moritz Schlick and the Vienna Circle was founded: the most famous school 
in Viennese history (Smith, 1994: 20).
His students however were able to obtain posts in universities elsewhere in Austria, 
and to propagate Brentanian philosophy to the extent that it acquired the status of 
3  Aristotelica: Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles ([On the several 
senses of being in Aristotle], 1862), Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom 
nous poietikos ([The psychology of Aristotle], 1867), Über den Creatianismus des Aristoteles ([On 
Aristotle’s creationism], 1882), Aristoteles’ Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes ([Aristotle’s 
theory of the origin of human soul/intellect],1911), Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung ([Aristotle 
and his world view], 1911). There is also a rather considerable Nachlass: Über Aristoteles ([On 
Aristotle], 1986) plus numerous manuscripts, and Husserl’s memoirs (Husserl, 1919).
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a semi -official philosophy of the Empire. Brentano’s students included, beside marty 
and Ehrenfels, also Freud, Thomas masaryk (subsequently founder and first president 
of the erstwhile Czechoslovak republic), meinong, Husserl, Stumpf and Twardowski. 
The most orthodox Brentanists congregated around marty in Prague, whose circle in-
cluded also other former students of Brentano, such as Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil. 
The Prague Brentanists took up the task of developing and disseminating Brentano’s 
doctrines with an almost religious fervour. A group of them met regularly in the 
Café Louvre (now a sex shop4) on the Ferdinandstrasse, for ‘training’ in Brentanian 
modes of thought and of philosophical discussion and argument. Hugo Bergmann, 
Emil Utitz and Oskar Pollak, three close schoolfriends of Kafka, were all initiated 
into this circle, and Bergmann, in his turn, seems to have recruited Kafka himself. 
There is evidence testifying to the fact that, at least between the years 1903 and 1906, 
Kafka frequently attended meetings of what was called the ‘inner circle of Brentanists’ 
(Smith, 1997: 85).
Ironically, Brentano’s misfortune proved to be a blessing for the European 
philosophy. If things had turned out differently, his teachings would not have 
had such a wide -ranging audience (see the graz School, the Lvov -Warsaw 
School, the Prague School and even the munich phenomenologists) and Bren-
tanism would not have become the ‘semi -official philosophy of the Empire’, as 
Smith accurately calls it.
There is also one more line of explanation of the aforementioned ‘non -
-existence’, taken from Husserl’s memoirs (Husserl, 1919). According to Hus-
serl, Brentano never saw himself as having set up any kind of school (not only 
in the institutional sense, but — more importantly to him — in the intellec-
tual sense), as there was not one student with whom he felt entirely satisfied — 
a rather surprising statement given the distinguished and devoted nature of his 
students. He was — as Husserl puts it — easily offended whenever they would 
steer away from his original views (indeed, not doing this must have been hard 
not only in terms of their personal development but also due to Brentano’s 
rather frequent changes of mind). Dale Jacquette (2006) stresses this feature of 
his character when referring to how much Husserl hurt his master.
In march 1917, when Brentano was dying in Zurich, he felt he was some-
how ‘childless’, with no proper heir to his thought. This must have been largely 
due to how he understood the relationship between master and student as 
for Brentano, a genuine emotional commitment together with an intellectual 
congeniality were required. He strongly believed that he had been chosen as 
Aristotle’s heir and he claimed to be one of his three most faithful students 
and his third son, along with Eudemus and Theophrastus. What I wish to 
emphasize by all of this is that — according to Brentano — personal acquaint-
ance was not a necessary premise for any potential heir. At least, it was not as 
4  Barry Smith wrote this paper in 1997. As far as I am concerned, now (at least from 2012) 
there is a music shop.
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important as the other features listed above. And thus I believe that from the 
two famous Brentanists who never met their teacher — namely Heidegger and 
Kafka — Brentano would have chosen Kafka as his pupil, even though it was 
Heidegger who explicitly considered himself Brentano’s heir. In actual fact, 
I think Heidegger would have deeply offended Brentano — or even have com-
mitted patricide! — least of all by his rejection of intentionality. Why would 
he choose Kafka? We will see below.
The case with marty is, no doubt, much easier: Brentano and marty were 
friends for life and exchanged thousands of letters. marty is known as the most 
orthodox student of Brentano and for a good reason.
SECTION 1
I shall concentrate here on Brentano’s early immanence intentionality / inten-
tional in -existence thesis. This thesis argues that the intended objects of our 
thoughts belong to their respective mental acts, they are cont a ined  within 
them. They are i n  the acts of thought.
Let us take a look at two quotations, one from Dale Jacquette (2006) and 
one from Kevin mulligan (2006). The first one describes the nature of the 
intentional object, and the second one can be used to illustrate what Peter 
Simons calls Brentano’s ‘methodological phenomenalism’.
The sense of ‘in’ in Brentano’s phrase ‘intentional’ in -existence is thus locative rather 
than negative. It specifies where the intended object of a thought is to be located, 
rather than qualifies it negatively as nonexistent (Jacquette, 2006: 102).
External perception does not give us the right to assume that physical phenomena exist 
(mulligan, 2006: 71).
These statements outline the main issues of this section. I shall thus look 
at two important questions that where the subject of marty’s Prague lectures, 
Grundfragen der deskripitiven Psychologie, attended by Kafka from 1902: (a) the 
distinction between physical and mental phenomena and (b) inner perception 
and outer perception. marty, in his early work, was an adherent of the imma-
nentist thesis, i.e. he believed that every phenomenon of human mind had an 
object, and intentionally referred to it.
Let me begin by muddying the waters a little. max Brod (1884 –1968), 
Kafka’s friend, biographer and self -appointed editor, dismissed the idea that 
Kafka was inspired by philosophy at all. He claimed that ‘Kafka spoke in im-
ages, because he thought in images’ (Smith, 1997: 83). Surprisingly, this can 
actually be seen as good news. After all this ‘thinking in images’ is not entirely 
divorced from the theory of intentional objects, is it? I also believe it can be 
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reconciled with Klaus Wagenbach’s opinion that psychology and ethics were 
very important for Kafka’s intellectual and literary formation (Smith, 1997). It 
also reminds me of Wagenbach’s saying that Kafka — as a child — loved go-
ing to the cinema (Wagenbach, 2002). I will mention this again in Section 4.
Ad (A)
Brentano opens PES by distinguishing between physical and mental phenom-
ena. The latter display the feature of intentionality (although the word ‘inten-
tionality’ is never explicitly used by Brentano). And it is this feature which 
fundamentally characterizes all mental phenomena as we learn from the famous 
‘intentionality quote’ which also enumerates their three classes:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, relation to a content, 
direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as a reality), or 
immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object 
within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation 
something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love 
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on (Brentano, 1995: 68).
Jacquette makes an interesting observation here: ‘He not only identifies 
intentionality as the distinctive mark of the mental, but makes intentionality 
the foundation for an empirical scientific philosophy of mind that surpasses 
anything that had previously been contemplated’ (Jacquette, 2006: 100). Thus 
psychology is, in fact, the basis for philosophy. I would therefore like to take 
a look at Tim Crane’s remark that Brentano changed the definition of psychol-
ogy into the ‘science of mental phenomena’ as opposed the more etymologi-
cally correct ‘science of the soul’ (Crane, 2006). It is the second part of this 
observation that is interesting since what is etymologically correct usually de-
picts the way we commonly think more adequately. I am aware it may appear 
somewhat banal to state this but if psychology is commonly understood to 
refer purely to the soul, it takes a radical change of mind to break away from 
this idea and to come to terms with the soul’s removal (and therefore speak of 
mental phenomena instead). Likewise Crane also states: ‘Brentano talks ap-
provingly of Lange’s idea of “psychology without a soul”. What he has in mind 
here is that psychology can proceed while being indifferent on the question of 
whether there is a soul: for “whether or not there are souls, there are mental 
phenomena” ’ (Crane, 2006: 28).
It is thus high time to present the first similarity between Brentano, marty 
and Kafka. The soul — or rather what used to be the soul in the older para-
digm — is usually identified not only with the substantial self in Aristotelian 
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or Christian/Aristotelian sense, but with our self. We tend to think that we are 
our souls (no matter what the term designates or whether we are religiously 
inclined). And it is exactly this problem that kept Kafka awake at night: we do 
not know ourselves (our ‘self ’). We only live through the mental phenomena as 
they appear — although he probably would not have phrased it in such philo-
sophical jargon. And these phenomena are all we have. For Kafka the self is 
an enigma. And thus Kafka, in his Diaries, provides a perfect definition of the 
former self reformulated in what I call the non -substratum view on the soul: 
‘I am nothing but literature and c an  and want  to be nothing else’.5 By claim-
ing that mental phenomena are all we have/are, Kafka becomes a partisan of 
the intentional in -existence thesis. During one of marty’s lectures he became 
acquainted with this new definition of psychology and it must have appealed to 
him as it accurately illustrated his own intuitions. Interestingly, when Calasso 
writes about The trial and Joseph K’s famous plea to the Court, he stresses that 
this plea is motivated by a peculiar illusion that literature can somehow fill the 
gaps in our self -awareness. maybe, thanks to literature, we can know ourselves 
better. To translate it into Brentano — marty terms: we cannot know the self, 
but somehow we can know the particular mental phenomena.
In this case, as in many other cases, Joseph K. is Kafka’s obvious porte ­
­parole. Kafka was writing incessantly, night after night, to understand himself 
and all he achieved can be summarized in the above statement that he was 
nothing but literature. Calasso concludes that this aforementioned illusion is 
— needless to say — childish (Calasso, 2011: 191). However, I wish to stress 
that Kafka not only says that he c annot  be anything else, but that he also 
does not want to be. This may not be very optimistic, I admit, but at least it 
reveals an acceptance of one’s paradoxical fate.
Ad (b)
What does this mean that we do not know ourselves? This question becomes 
even more puzzling if we realize the consequences of the early Brentano — 
marty claim that the objects of inner perception exist necessarily (in the sense 
that we are sure that they exist when they are obtained and not that they 
somehow exist in and of themselves), whereas the outside world is, at most, 
probable (‘methodological phenomenalism’). Shouldn’t our internal world be 
therefore more familiar to us? The answer is a firm no, because there is no 
such thing as proper introspection. Smith quotes Kafka: ‘The introspection, 
understood as observing one’s mental states, is like a dog trying to catch its 
5  In the published parts of PES Brentano resigns from the time -honored account of the 
soul as a substratum for mental phenomena. From now on the mental phenomena have no 
underlying substratum. They form a chain/bundle.
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tail’ (Smith, 1997: 91). I think of this as a sort of freeze -frame as it brings to 
mind the possibility of pausing in the middle of a film whenever we wish to 
take a closer look at something that would otherwise be happening too quickly 
for us to perceive. This freeze -frame is impossible with regards to our mental 
lives. I cannot stop laughing at a joke to watch myself laughing at it. I cannot 
hang my despair on a coat rack like a coat if I want to have a look at it or put 
it on later (if I were a masochist for wanting to relive it, that is). I can only live 
through these mental states, nothing more.
Brentano’s inner perception must be clearly distinguished from introspec-
tion. But then also we are awa r e  of what ‘is taking place in our mind; we are 
conscious — obliquely, as it were — of the judgment itself, a certain psychi-
cal phenomenon. Similarly, in seeing directly before us the pattern itself, we 
are conscious, obliquely, of our seeing of the pattern. And it is this oblique 
consciousness, present in all mental experiences whatsoever, which is what 
Brentano means by inner perception’ (Smith, 1997: 92).
Inner perception is not inner observation, for the latter modifies where it does not 
destroy its object, says Brentano in 1874. He seems never to have changed his mind on 
this point (mulligan, 2006: 73 –74).
All this shows, in my opinion, why gregor Samsa did not just f e e l  like 
a worm, he simply wa s  a worm. In other words: the worm was his primary 
object of perception, immanent in his mental act. If he were to engage in the 
proper observation and watch the beetle under the microscope, he would be in 
the same position as a human scientist and this would no doubt alter — if not 
destroy — the scrutinized object. The very first words of The metamorphosis 
are as follows:
As gregor Samsa awoke from unsettling dreams one morning, he found himself trans-
formed in his bed into a monstrous vermin. He lay on his hard armorlike back and 
when he raised his head a little he saw his vaulted black belly divided into sections by 
stiff arches from whose height the coverlet had already slipped and was about to slide 
off completely. His many legs, which were pathetically thin compared to the rest of his 
bulk, flickered helplessly before his eyes (Kafka, 1996: 7).
It may seem as if I were merely repeating Smith’s thesis about gregor’s 
condition but this is not entirely the case. I wholeheartedly accept the view 
that gregor in fact was a worm and not that he had a bad day and only felt 
like one. Nevertheless, I differ regarding the justification of this thesis and 
especially in regards to the interpretation of The metamorphosis’ opening lines. 
Smith says that the outer world has changed for gregor: ‘the external world 
which is normally taken for granted there has been substituted a quite differ-
ent world, having peculiar qualities’ (Smith, 1997: 91). I, on the other hand, 
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think that the world has remained exactly the same and all the family mem-
bers do their best to preserve it. gregor even tries to go to work despite the 
fact that he cannot get out of bed. This is because it is gregor, not the world, 
that has changed. I agree with Smith that he is separated by the impossibil-
ity of communication, but he is not ‘in the position of dispassionate observer’ 
as Smith puts it. On the contrary, I think he is anything but a dispassionate 
observer (see Section 3). He is indeed a lone observer but he is well aware that 
he is the main protagonist of the drama and that he is the focal point of this 
world (even though his role consists in being neglected and humiliated). He 
is, in fact, very passionate: he wants to communicate and he wants to go back 
to his world which he sees and misses but cannot enter (given that he is both 
unable and not allowed). Even the description of the room I will present be-
low shows that the world has not altered. And, interestingly, it is Smith who 
quotes Kafka’s diary entry saying that his knowledge of his room is bigger 
than his knowledge of himself and that the inner world can only be lived, but 
not described. The room, on the other hand, can be described (independently 
of whether the Simonsian ‘methodological phenomenalism’ is in force or not; 
we can describe what we see before us). I will therefore use the description of 
gregor’s room as an argument against Smith and thus reinforce my claim that 
the world has not changed, and gregor has: both as the intentional object for 
himself and for the family.
gregor’s bedroom is an essential motif in The metamorphosis. Actually, for 
gregor, the boundaries of his room are the boundaries of his world. As soon 
as gregor learns how to use the multitude of his furry legs, he starts stroll-
ing around his room and he strolls incessantly for weeks. ‘He especially liked 
hanging from the ceiling; it was entirely different from lying on the floor’ — 
Kafka comments, not without a touch of irony (Kafka, 1996: 29). However, 
such an exact topography would be impossible with regard to oneself, not to 
mention one’s ‘self ’. The reader easily notices that gregor’s room is depicted 
in more detail than gregor’s internal world. There is the window with its 
windowpanes overlooking the hospital on Charlotte Street; the sofa he hides 
under, the coverlet that (at least partially) covers his body whenever he lies on 
or under the sofa; the door with its lock and its key (the symbolic border of 
two separate worlds); the carpet used to scratch and clean his back; the heavy, 
almost immovable bureau; the chair (which his sister manipulates according to 
gregor’s needs — or rather what she understands his needs to be at the very 
beginning), as well as two absolutely crucial items, gregor’s raison d’étre: the 
desk and the picture of a lady in furs on the wall. The desk is an indispensable 
item in all Kafka’s works6: the father has a desk and the head clerk has one from 
which he reigns over the world — to mention but a few. This indispensability 
6  See The trial, The castle, The judgment.
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is most fully demonstrated when grete and their mother remove the furniture 
from gregor’s room. They do it, allegedly, to give him some more free space to 
stroll, but later on they turn the room into no more than a lumber room. And 
this is how they stab him in the back for the first time.
SECTION 2
Let me now get to the analysis of some of the emotional issues present in 
The metamorphosis using the tools prepared by marty and Brentano. These 
issues will concern not only gregor, but also the other actors of the drama, 
i.e. die Familie Samsa and gregor’s younger sister grete in particular.
In 1874 he [Brentano — S.K.] thought not only that whenever a psychological phe-
nomenon occurs a judging and so a presenting occurs, but also that an emotion must 
occur (mulligan, 2006: 72).
So, let us first have a look at the presentations and then see what follows. 
Looking at him, gregor’s parents do not see their son — they see a giant worm 
with furry legs and an armor -like trunk. marty claimed that we tend to in-
stinctively think that what we perceive exists, exactly like children do.7 It takes 
higher cognitive activities to separate the intuitive faith and really analyze the 
particular case: ‘rather sensing is an act which contains two mutually insepa-
rable parts, the intuition of the physical phenomenon and assertoric acceptance 
thereof ’.
Let me supplement this with a quotation from Arkadiusz Chrudzimski:
The mental acts from which the concepts of existence and non -existence are distilled 
are acceptances and rejections which are evident, and as such, as Brentano puts this, 
are ‘intrinsically characterised as right’. According to Brentano ‘to exist’ thus means 
roughly ‘to be an object of a possible right acceptance’ and ‘not to exist’ means correla-
tively ‘to be an object of a possible right rejection’ […]. marty also accepts this analysis 
(Chrudzimski, 2013: 15).
The parents judge correctly that what they see is a worm and, consequently, 
when an emotion in relation to it occurs, then it is the emotion of hate. The 
reverse is also true: gregor has a presentation of his parents and correctly 
judges that what he sees are his parents. He too has a Gemütsbewegung, only in 
his case this is a phenomenon of love — his love for them being unconditional 
(which I will expand on below). In both cases the emotions are correct. I do 
not wish to say that hatred itself is correct (at this point it would be better to 
7  This is taken from mulligan (2006), from an 1895 lecture by marty quoted by Kraus: 
Towards a phenomenognosy of time consciousness.
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steer away from objective values) but that the emotions occur as a consequence 
of the presentations and judgments, so their emotional correctness is ‘forced’ 
by the correctness of the judgment i.e. a worm is something worth hating.
OTHEr ONTOLOgICAL mODELS
From mulligan (2006: 72 –74) we learned what Brentano thought in 1874: that 
the object of presentation, judgment and emotion is the same thing — only 
the cognitive/mental modi alter. But we must also remember that he changed 
his mind many times, as well as of the fact that marty was not always ‘faith-
ful’ to his master. I shall thus consider some of the other ontological variants 
and see whether my study of the Samsas can work according to these different 
ontological models as well.
I believe that my interpretation so far works in a similar way to Brentano’s 
early notion of ‘parsimonious ontology’ as Chrudzimski puts it, as well as in 
his later, less official, and more robust view of accepting transcendent entities 
which is closer to marty’s conviction that there must be something in the world 
(i.e. a truth -maker for emotions = Wertverhalt) that makes a thing — to use 
Chrudzimski’s words again — easier or harder to love or hate and that evidence 
is not sufficient to constitute a correct judgment or — for that matter — emo-
tion. If we steer away from early Brentano’s immanentism and move to marty’s 
ontology consisting of real (Realia) and non real entities (Irrealia), then we will 
see that gregor (even as a vermin) falls into the first category. We should treat 
him as a substance in the good old Aristotelian sense, as he can introduce causal 
change in the real world, he came into being at particular moment in time and 
he will definitely pass away at another (the three conditions of being a substance 
are thus fulfilled). This is, at least, what I consider to be the case. However, if 
someone wanted to treat gregor more like a propositional content (that is: to 
rate him among the existent but not real beings [Irrealia]), then my interpreta-
tion would hold as well. Non -real things aren’t in any sense weaker for marty, 
but they cannot be engaged in any causal nexus in any proper sense. Instead, 
they supervene the causality of real entities. Nevertheless, even as a non real be-
ing, gregor can still be an intentional object about which one can make judg-
ments that will, in turn, induce a Wertverhalt, i.e. a truth -maker for emotions. 
The difference lies in the fact that marty claimed there were some objective 
values in the world. Let me quote Chrudzimski again: ‘The official Brentano 
insisted on the objective soundness of ethics and introduced emotional evidence 
as a primitive concept. marty introduced mind independent states of values in 
the role of truth -makers for our emotions’ (Chrudzimski, 2009: 183).
To The metamorphosis, the seed -bed of the whole tragedy, I dare say, is due 
to a lack of communication between the family members. They see nothing 
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else but this giant worm and (wrongly) assume that the worm does not under-
stand them. I will say more on communication below.
Now, let us take a look at gregor’s younger sister, whose attitude demon-
strates significant differences when compared with that of her parents (who 
are rather consistent in their negative view which has a lot to do with reduc-
ing gregor to the role he plays in the family (see below); one can say that the 
mother is ‘half -way’ between her former motherly feelings and the overwhelm-
ing emotion of revulsion, but she soon sides with her husband). The parents 
reject gregor as a person and an equal member of their family on the basis of 
seeing a worm, accepting there being a worm (correct existential judgment) 
and hating it. grete, on the other hand, has a Vorstellung of a worm, but she 
judges differently. She rejects the impression, so to speak, because what she 
wants to see is her beloved brother gregor. And thus she has the Gemüts­
bewegung of love toward him, despite the fact that what she perceives is, in 
fact, a worm. If we stick to the view that an emotion is inherited and that it 
is a natural product of the presentation and judgment, then her love will be 
incorrect. She thus engages in the higher cognitive activity as suggested by 
marty. The Gemütsbewegung is thus not directed towards the object of her ac-
tual perception but rather towards what she wishes to see, i.e. to another object 
introduced by her mental apparatus. She also thinks that he cannot understand 
her, but she engages in activities that are meant to make his life easier or at 
least bearable. She feeds him and compassionately comments on how much he 
ate and why, and she even tries to adjust the food to his needs (which amounts 
to giving him the leftovers). She cleans his room regularly, sets the chair by the 
window to let him enjoy the view and turns the blind eye whenever she thinks 
he does not want to be seen.
As time passes however, grete becomes much more similar to her parents 
in her demeanor (the turning point is the re -arrangement of the room and the 
‘poster -incident’ when gregor climbs onto the wall to rescue the picture of 
the lady in furs with his own body and thus scares her mother which, in turn, 
causes grete to lose her temper) and her case becomes philosophically clearer 
(and thus harder for gregor). As time goes on, what she sees is a worm and 
nothing/nobody else (she even starts to refer to gregor as ‘it’) and upon this 
a feeling of hatred toward it/him supervenes. We must bear in mind that the 
intentionality of emotions is ‘inherited from that of their bases, presentations 
and, in some cases judgments’ (mulligan, 2006: 81). Brentano later changed 
his mind on the inheritance of emotions, but giving an adequate account of it 
would surpass the limits of this paper. For now let us say that the following 
implication is in force: presentation → judgment → emotion. To make a long 
story short: if grete perceives a furry vermin and she has a correct existential 
judgment ‘a furry vermin exists’, then her hatred is correct and her love was 
incorrect.
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THE OrIgIN OF THE KNOWLEDgE OF rIgHT AND WrONg — 
A DIgrESSION
There is one more highly interesting issue in Brentano, rooted in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, i.e. loving/hating somebody/something for the sake of this 
person/thing, or for the sake of someone/something else. No doubt his parents 
loved gregor (before the vermin -phase) purely for the function he played in 
their lives (as the family bread -winner and thus a means to and end) and not 
him himself. gregor, by contrast, loved them unconditionally. Towards the 
end of the novella, we see that grete goes the same way as her parents. Let us 
take a careful look at the final scene in The metamorphosis which is the most 
terrifying of all:
It occurred almost simultaneously to both Herr and Frau Samsa, while they were 
conversing and looking at their increasingly vivacious daughter, that despite the recent 
sorrows that had paled her cheeks, she had blossomed into a pretty and voluptuous 
young woman. growing quieter and almost unconsciously communicating through 
exchanged glances, they thought it was time to find her a good husband. And it was 
like a confirmation of their new dreams and good intentions that at their journey’s end 
their daughter jumped to her feet and stretched her young body (Kafka, 1996: 51–52).
Perhaps this is supposed to be a ‘punishment’ for the reification she exer-
cised on her brother? After her own metamorphosis (I strongly believe that 
this title does not refer only to gregor, because they are all transformed during 
the narrative) she becomes the cruelest of them all and it is her who suggests 
getting rid of ‘it’.
If they loved gregor’s function or, if love is too strong of a word here, 
if they had a positive Gemütsbewegung toward the bread -winner, they must 
have judged that there existed a bread -winner as the primary object of their 
perception, which finally brings us to the root of the matter, i.e. the presenta-
tion (a backwards analysis). This therefore invites us to probe deeper into the 
question as to how they perceived him in the first place, before he turned into 
vermin? Did they perceive Gregor = Gregor (in Kripke -style) or perhaps Gregor 
= bread ­winner (in russell -style)?8
SECTION 3
Here I shall try to read The metamorphosis in light of marty’s philosophy of 
language and especially in relation to its pragmatic aspect and teleology. The 
8  What I have in mind here is Saul Kripke’s rigid designator and Bertrand russell’s theory 
of description.
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essence of it is the purposeful manifestation of inner life via conventional signs. 
And this is exactly what is beyond gregor’s reach, as he does not possess the 
ability to speak, not having proper mouth (or teeth for that matter!). One 
could argue that this falls outside the scope of marty’s philosophy of language 
as this is an issue of phonology which he was not concerned with at all. How-
ever, it is these physical hindrances which prevent gregor from acting accord-
ing to societal convention. He is like a prisoner in his own head, surrounded 
by myriads of mental acts he cannot verbalize. ‘Apparently his words were no 
longer understandable even though they were clear enough to him, clearer 
than before’ (Kafka, 1996: 15). He thus has no access to human conventional 
signs and we are left wondering what it would be like if he encountered another 
worm of his kind. For the rest of the Samsas, communication is impossible as 
they wrongly assume that gregor does not understand them. Even if commu-
nication were possible however, I feel they would be unlikely to want to talk to 
him — but this is a different story altogether. They are therefore unable (and 
unwilling) to fulfill the condition of successful communication, namely: that 
the speech has to influence the mental life of the interlocutor. They somehow 
influence it, however, by talking behind his back and assuming he does not 
understand, though this is largely unconsciously done. grete addresses him 
only once, when she is very angry, but this is rather an expression of her emo-
tional state than an appeal to him directly. According to marty, a sentence 
is meaningful if, and only if, it is understood. And again, we have an absurd 
situation here: their utterances are understood even though they are unaware 
of it and gregor’s trials of communication are thwarted at the very beginning, 
as the sounds he makes are those of an animal. gregor suffers his greatest de-
feat when he tries explicitly to engage in communication with them. He tries 
to approach his sister while she is playing the violin to the three lodgers who 
cannot appreciate it. ‘And is he a beast if music moves him so?’ — gregor asks 
himself. It is also interesting to note that he was not very fond of music before 
he turned into a worm.
The real communication breakdown comes when gregor is brutally driven 
to his room after which he realizes he ‘has to go’. We are left unsure as to 
whether he has heard grete’s remark that if it were gregor, and not a furry 
beast, then he would definitely have gone some time ago, or not. Neverthe-
less, gregor decides it is time to die. When it is over the father exclaims 
‘Thank god’ and they all write letters to their bosses asking for a day off to 
go for a walk and celebrate their release. They even feel offended when the 
charwoman comes to tell them that gregor’s remains have been taken care 
of: she has swept him up, opened the window and let his soul go. It is pe-
culiar to note that she maintains this tradition as if she believed that he still 
had a soul…
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SECTION 4
After the immAnenzkrise — the nominAlist interpretAtion of kAfkA
This communication breakdown brings us to the final section that covers the 
nomen omen nominalist interpretation of The metamorphosis. When Brentano 
rejected Irrealia he used, so to speak, Ockham’s razor to deal with his baroque 
ontology. He even said — in a letter to marty (1905) — that he had always (!) 
believed that what was represented by mental states were in fact the real beings, 
the Aristotelian substances.
In his book K, Calasso argues that Ockham’s razor was Kafka’s favorite tool. 
He writes that Kafka always picked only the necessary objects from the sur-
rounding world and referred to them precisely and literally (Calasso, 2011: 9). 
This is how, according to Calasso, Kafka should be read: literally. To translate 
it to Brentano’s and marty’s philosophical language: all he provided were the 
presentations or the pictures (bringing us back to Brod’s thesis that Kafka 
spoke in images and to Wagenbach’s ‘cinema anecdote’). If all we get from Kaf-
ka are images of the meticulously chosen objects (however, I would be careful 
with calling him a nominalist or a reist, because the pictures obviously suggest 
conceptualism), i.e. the presentations, then the judgment and the emotion fall 
upon the shoulders of the reader, i.e. they are not ‘inherited’ from the presenta-
tions. On one hand this gives the reader more freedom of interpretation but, 
on the other, it makes his work much harder to understand.
CONCLUSION
As a reader, I am personally more inclined towards the interpretation from 
the sections 1 –3 which only goes to show how complicated it is to give and 
an exhaustive account of this work. Kafka is, indeed, indefinable and thus the 
desired philosophical interpretation becomes something of a wild goose chase. 
Needless to say, his literature (or rather he a s  the literature) can be compared 
with many other currents of thought from that time, existentialist philosophy 
being the first to spring to mind. As I stated above, Kafka was a member not 
only of the Brentano Circle but attended other meetings in search of his entel­
echia. One of the most important of these meetings took place in Café Arco, 
situated near the famous Café Louvre where the Brentanists would congregate. 
If we want to call him a Brentanist (which I hope to have proved plausible), we 
must bear in mind that of all the possible ‘labels’ we can ascribe to Kafka, this 
is but one of many.
What Kafka undoubtedly shares with Brentano, however, is a common fea-
ture of intellectual reception. Everybody has ‘his or her Kafka’ just as everybody 
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has ‘his or her Brentano’ (marty, as an ‘orthodox Brentanist’, seems easier to 
grasp — maybe the ongoing research on marty’s work will help to ‘emancipate’ 
him). Besides simply saying what it was about Kafka, therefore, that has made 
him susceptible to so many varying interpretations, it is worth showing what 
it was about Brentano that allowed him to influence almost every intellectual 
current of fin du siècle Europe.
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